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THE LEGACY OF CHERNOBYL: ITS SIGNIFICANCE 
FOR THE UKRAINE AND THE WORLD 
Ellen Bober Moynagh* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
More than eight years have passed since the Chernobyl disaster in 
April of 1986.1 Today, Chernobyl serves as a graphic symbol of the 
massive environmental problems inherited by the former Soviet re-
publics and of the resulting challenges and obstacles faced by not only 
these young republics but indeed by the entire global community. The 
fragility of the sarcophagus built around the crippled reactor in a 
desperate attempt to contain its radioactive poisons2 resembles the 
vulnerable, unstable, and fragile condition of the members of the 
Commonwealth of Independent States,3 and in particular for purposes 
of this Note, of the Ukraine. 
Chernobyl is important not only as an example of the environmental 
legacy created by Soviet communism~ the existing and potential dam-
age from the Chernobyl incident also remains a significant threat to 
the world's population and the environment.5 In fact, the continuing 
economic and political instability in the Ukraine and the other Repub-
* Articles Editor, 1993-1994, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW. 
1 See, e.g., Grelmpeace Accuses "Nuclear Lobby" of Falsifying Chernobyl Documents, Eur. 
Info. Serv.: European Energy, Dec. 3,1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, International 
File. 
2 See David L. Chandler, Study Says Chernobyl Core Melted Dawn, BOSTON SUN. GLOBE, 
Jan. 30, 1994, at I. 
3 The Commonwealth of Independent States is a loose union of nations formerly belonging to 
the Soviet Union. It was established on December 9,1991, by Russia, the Ukraine, and Byelorus-
sia, and is open to all former members of the Soviet Union. Serge Schmemann, Declaring Death 
of Soviet Union, Russia and Two Republics Form New Commonwealth, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 
1991, at AI. 
4 See James O. Jackson, Nuclear Time Bombs, TIME, Dec. 7, 1992, at 44-45. 
5 See glmerally Boris Sitnikov, U.N. Committee on Cleaning Up Aftermath of Chernobyl 
Disaster, TASS, Nov. 17, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, International File. 
709 
710 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 21:709 
lics prevents them from improving their infrastructure and forces 
them to remain dependent on an extensive, unsafe nuclear industry.6 
Given these continuing effects and dangers, many of those most 
affected by these environmental threats are desperate to refocus 
global attention on the continuing dangers of ChernobyP Georgy 
Gotovchits, the Ukrainian minister in charge of handling the conse-
quences of Chernobyl, expressed frustration and concern over the 
apathy he encountered during his 1991 mission to the United Nations 
to solicit international aid to help deal with the effects of the disaster.8 
He stated that U.N. members were more concerned with the various 
current global crises and regarded Chernobyl as something that hap-
pened a long time ago.9 Gotovchits sought to change those attitudes 
with a warning that without Western assistance, another tragedy for 
mankind could occur.lO 
Because the media bombards society daily with details of new crises 
from around the world, and because the sheer volume of such stories 
dictates that a particular event normally receives publicity only for a 
limited period of time, it is easy to understand how a disaster such as 
Chernobyl quickly becomes a distant nightmare to those who have 
not been directly affected by it. This phenomenon is even more likely 
to occur with Chernobyl because much of the damage and long-term 
effects caused by the accident are still unknownll or untold,12 and 
because radiation, though potentially deadly and enduring, is invis-
ible.13 
Recent developments within the Ukraine indicate that perhaps it 
is not only those who are far-removed from the effects of Chernobyl 
who need to be reminded of the dangers presented by the former 
Soviet Union's nuclear industry. In October of 1993, the Ukrainian 
parliament voted 221 to 38 to reverse its decision to close the Cher-
nobyl nuclear power station by the end of 1993.14 The vote also in-
6 See Judith Perera, Russia Unions Complain Workers Not Compensated, Int'l Press Serv., 
Nov. 3, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, International File. See also John Leslie, 
Survey of World Nuclear Industry, THE FINAN. TIMES LTD., Nov. 17, 1993, at 18. 
7 See generally Stephen Nisbet, Ukraine Appeals to West Not to Forget Chernobyl, REUTERS 
LIBR. REP., Feb. 20, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, International File. 
S See id. 
9Id. 
10Id. 
11 See Frank Wright, Pollution's Havoc is Clear; Solutions are Not; Rubles Pitted Against 
the Health of a Fragile Nation, STAR TRIBUNE, Oct. 13, 1991, at 17A. 
12 See Chandler, supra note 2, at 12. 
13 See GRIGORI MEDVEDEV, THE TRUTH ABOUT CHERNOBYL 83 (Evelyn Rossiter, trans., 
Basic Books, Inc., 1990). 
14 Ron Popeski, Ukraine Votes to Keep Chernobyl, Press Ass'n Newsfile, Oct. 21, 1993, avail-
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cluded a decision to lift a 1990 moratorium on the completion and 
creation of new nuclear energy facilities. 15 In addition, recent state-
ments by many officials in the Ukraine have attempted to minimize 
the dangers and extent of damage from the Chernobyl accident and 
have portrayed any contradictory information as "misinformation."16 
Given the alarming statistics and predictions contained in several 
recent reports regarding conditions at Chernobyl, these actions on the 
part of Ukrainian officials indicate that Gotovchit's warning has be-
come particularly relevant and timely.17 
This Comment examines Chernobyl's continuing significance in 
light of these recent developments. Section II describes the relevant 
events which occurred before, during, and after the Chernobyl acci-
dent. 18 Section III explains how the Soviet legal system was incapable 
of preventing the Chernobyl accident or controlling its effects. This 
section demonstrates that the Soviet system actually created the 
environment that was conducive to such an accident.19 Section IV 
discusses the major changes which occurred after, and in part because 
of Chernobyl. It focuses particularly on current attempts to use the 
emerging legal system in the Ukraine to confront Chernobyl's leg-
acy.20 Section V describes how the political and economic realities 
facing the Ukraine have caused its leaders to de-prioritize environ-
mental problems including Chernobyl, and have left the country in-
creasingly incapable of dealing not only with Chernobyl's aftermath, 
but also with the threat of similar crises presented by the current 
operation of its other nuclear energy facilities.21 Finally, Section VI 
examines why these problems should be of the utmost concern to the 
able in LEXIS, Nexis Library, International File. Reactor number four was the one that was 
crippled in the 1986 disaster, and the decision not to shut down the active reactors affects 
numbers one and three. See Economic Meltdawn Leads Ukraine to Resume Building Nuclear 
Plants, THE OTTOWA CITIZEN, reprinted in THE GUARDIAN, Oct. 22, 1993, at A7. Reactor 
number two has been closed since 1991, when it was damaged by a fire, and it is not yet known 
if it will be restarted as a result of the recent decision. Ukrainian Parliament Votes to Keep 
Chernobyl Plant Operating, Agence France Presse, Oct. 21, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis 
Library, International File. 
15 Popeski, supra note 14. 
16 Ukraine Denounces "Misinformation" Abont Chernobyl, REUTERS, LTD., Dec. 28, 1993, 
available in LEXIS, N exis Library, International File. 
17 See Chandler, supra note 2, for details of the most recent, unprecedented, and in-depth 
investigation of the status of the crippled reactor and of the damage it caused by Alexander 
Sich, an MIT graduate student, who spent 18 months at Chernobyl. 
18 See infra notes 23-127 and accompanying text. 
19 See infra notes 128--305 and accompanying text. 
20 See infra notes 306--33 and accompanying text. 
21 See infra notes 334--B3 and accompanying text. 
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global community. In addition, this section will evaluate ways in which 
more developed nations might and should use emerging systems of 
international law and global economic assistance in order to improve 
the situation for the Ukraine, the other young Republics, and the 
entire world.22 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. The Experiment on Reactor Number Four 
On April 25, 1986, the personnel at the number four reactor of the 
Chernobyl nuclear power station were making final preparations for 
the fateful experiment which would lead to the world's worst nuclear 
disaster.23 The goal of the experiment was to find a temporary source 
of electricity to keep the plant running in the event of a power loss 
which could cause a meltdown of the reactor.24 Specifically, the Soviets 
hoped to find an energy source which would fill the thirty second gap 
before the diesel backup system could be started.25 While this gap is 
small enough for most plants to keep their vital systems operating, 
the Soviets were striving for a virtually continuous energy supply.26 
The test was designed to calculate the amount and duration of 
kinetic energy produced by one of the turbines' rotor blades, which, 
because of the blades' extreme heaviness, would continue to spin even 
after the power was shut downP The Soviets hoped to determine if 
this residual energy would be sufficient to fill the thirty second power 
gap.28 This goal was to be accomplished by reducing reactor power to 
lower then half its usual level, switching off one of the two turbines, 
and transferring all electricity to the remaining turbine, which would 
be used for the experiment.29 
Such tests had taken place successfully at Chernobyl, as well as at 
other plants,30 but with one vital difference: the reactor had remained 
22 See infra notes 364-95 and accompanying text. 
23 See MEDVEDEV, supra note 13, at 29, 32. 
24 See id. 
25 Victor G. Snell, Introduction to DAVID R. MARPLES, THE SOCIAL IMPACT OF THE CHER-
NOBYL DISASTER 12 (1988). 
26Id. 
27Id. at 12. 
28 See id. 
29Id. 
30 MEDvEDEV, supra note 13, at 35. 
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in a "stable, controlled state," with all safety systems functioning.31 
For this particular experiment, however, both the emergency reactor 
safety system and the "emergency core cooling system" were to be 
disabled so that they would not interfere with the tests when the 
reactor entered an unstable state.32 In the end, plant personnel in-
creased the risks of shutting down these systems by ignoring even 
the lax safety standards that were provided for in the plans for this 
unorthodox experiment.33 
By 1:05 p.m. on April 25, the plant operators had lowered the 
reactor to fifty percent power and had shut down the second turbine.34 
The experiment was then delayed for several hours due to an unex-
pected demand for electricity, but when the staff resumed the experi-
ment beginning at 11:10 p.m., the operator made a mistake which 
caused the power to fall well below the goal of around thirty percent, 
to about one percent.35 
When the power reached this dangerously low level, radioactive 
decay began and its products started poisoning the reactor.36 At this 
point, it would have been wise to delay the test and wait twenty-four 
hours in order to give the poisons an opportunity to dissipate.37 In-
stead, Anatoly Dyatlov, Deputy Chief Engineer in Charge of Opera-
tions for reactor units three and four,38 ordered the power to be 
increased.39 By approximately 1:00 a.m. on April 26, the senior reactor 
control engineer managed to raise power to seven percent.40 He was 
able to accomplish this increase by removing most of the absorber 
rods, which are used to control the nuclear reaction and, if necessary, 
to effectuate an "emergency shut-down" of the reactor.41 Unfortu-
nately, because of the design of the Chernobyl reactors, these at-
31 [d. Numerous other nuclear plants refused to take part in this particular experiment 
because of the hazards involved in shutting down the safety systems. [d. at 32. 
32 [d. at 35. Ironically, the engineers in charge believed that cold water entering a hot reactor 
would cause a "heat shock;" although that result was possible, it would have been much less 
serious than were the eventual results at Chernobyl, and the water might even have aided in 
controlling the deadly chain reaction. [d. at 47-48. 
33 [d. at 35. 
34 Snell, supra note 25, at 13. 
35 [d. 
36 MEDVEDEV, supra note 13, at 51. 
37 [d. at 54. 
38 [d. at 51. 
39 [d. at 55. 
40 Snell, supra note 25, at 15. 
41 [d. 
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tempts to increase power, combined with shutting down the safety 
mechanisms, had dire consequences.42 
B. The RMBK Reactor 
Reactor number four was one of twenty-seven similarly designed 
reactors in existence in the Soviet Union in 1986.43 The Soviets re-
ferred to these reactors by the acronym RMBK, which translates 
roughly to "reactor cooled by water and moderated by graphite."44 In 
RMBK reactors, the core consists of a cylinder which is twenty-three 
feet tall and about forty-six feet in diameter.45 The cylinder is filled 
with graphite columns, which have multiple openings to accommodate 
control rods.46 When all these rods are lowered, they shut down the 
chain reaction by absorbing neutrons.47 Nuclear fission begins when 
the rods are withdrawn, and the strength of the reaction depends on 
the number of rods withdrawn and the height to which they are 
removed.48 
The design of the control rods themselves played a significant role 
in causing the accident at Chernoby1.49 Under normal conditions, when 
the neutron absorbing section of the rod is inserted, it displaces the 
non-neutron absorbing graphite tip which then sits below the reac-
torso and controls the chain reaction through neutron absorption.51 
This process functions properly provided that the reactor is in a 
"controllable state."52 In order for the reactor to remain in a control-
lable state, its capacity for generating nuclear power cannot be 
greater than the control rods' ability to inhibit the chain reaction 
through neutron absorption.53 Soviet nuclear regulations required 
that there should always be at least twenty-eight to thirty control 
rods in the core in order to maintain this necessary balance.54 As 
stated above, however, the operators at reactor number four on April 
26 had removed the majority of the required control rods from the 
42 See MEDVEDEV, supra note 13, at 56. 
43 See Snell, supra note 25, at 4. 
44 [d. at 3. 
45 MEDVEDEV, supra note 13, at 33-34. 
46 [d. at 34. 
47 [d. 
48 [d. 
49 See id. at 59. 
50 Snell, supra note 25, at 16-17. 
51 MEDVEmEV, supra note 13, at 34. 
52 [d. at 35. 
53 [d. at 34. 
54 [d. After Chernobyl, the Soviets increased this number to 72 control rods. [d. 
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core in an attempt to return the power to a level high enough so that 
the test could take place. 55 Although these measures did not succeed 
in raising the power to an appropriate level to conduct the experi-
ment, the staff decided to proceed with the test anyway. 56 
The control rods that the operators had removed from the core had 
been raised so far that even the graphite tips sat above the lower 
section of the reactor.57 Therefore, rather than containing non-neu-
tron-absorbing graphite tips, the bottom of the core was filled only 
with water, which could absorb neutrons.58 If the control rods were 
then re-inserted, the graphite tips would displace the water, and there 
would be no source in the bottom of the core to control the reaction 
through neutron absorption.59 Such an action would yield the opposite 
of its intended effect: instead of a power decrease, there would be a 
rapid power increase.60 
c. The Accident and Its Aftermath 
When the operator noticed a power increase caused by a lack of 
water flow through the core and a subsequent build-up of steam, he 
activated the emergency power reduction system, i.e., the system 
designed to lower into the core all withdrawn control rods,61 the rods 
with the fateful graphite tips at their base.62 The rods were intended 
to travel a total of twenty-three feet, but became frozen forever at 
only 6.5-8 feet.63 Within four seconds, the power increased to a level 
approximately 100 times greater than full power, and the excess 
steam caused a series of tubes and containers to burst and lifted the 
concrete shield off of the reactor.64 
Beginning at 1:23 a.m.,65 there was a series of explosions which 
destroyed the reactor and the reactor building at unit number four.66 
The 500 pound shield and a portion of the core were blasted into the 
atmosphere, emitting fifty tons of nuclear fuel.67 A northwest wind 
66 See supra note 41 and accompanying text. 
56 MEDVEDEV, supra note 13, at 57. 
57 Snell, supra note 25, at 16. 
58 [d. 
59 See id. 
60 [d. at 18. 
6! MEDVEDEV, supra note 13, at 69-70. 
62 See supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text. 
63 MEDVEDEV, supra note 13, at 71. 
64 Snell, supra note 25, at 19. 
65 VLADIMIR M. CHERNOUSENKO, CHERNOBYL: INSIGHT FROM THE INSIDE 3 (1991). 
66 MEDVEDEV, supra note 13, at 77. 
67 [d. at 78, 82. 
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carried radioactive particles across Byelorussia, the Baltic republics, 
and beyond the territory of the Soviet Union to much of Europe.68 
During the ten days following the accident, the release of radionu-
clides continued, and strong and frequently changing winds exacer-
bated the problem of spreading contamination, thereby polluting ad-
ditional areas of the Ukraine, Byelorussia, the Russian Federation, 
and more of Europe.69 
An additional seventy tons of highly radioactive materials were 
ejected sideways, covering the new debris and the area surrounding 
the plant.70 The nuclear particles that were released included uranium 
dioxide, radionuclides of iodine-131, plutonium-239, neptunium-139, 
and cesium-137, strontium-90, all with varying half-lives.71 The re-
leased fuel had a level of radioactivity up to 15,000-20,000 roentgens 
per hour.72 
As a result of the explosions, there were approximately thirty fires 
which local firefighters were able to put out by about 5 a.m.73 Unfor-
tunately, many of these firefighters were among the first casualties as 
a result of exposure to massive doses of radiation.74 Indeed, many of 
68 [d. at 78; Stephen G. Kaplan, Note, Compensating Damage Arising from Global Nuclear 
Accidents: The Chernobyl Situation, 10 Loy. L.A. INTL & COMPo L.J. 241, 243 (1988). European 
nations directly affected by the radioactive cloud resulting from Chernobyl included Sweden, 
Poland, Finland, the Netherlands, Norway, Italy, and Hungary. [d. at 243 n.12. In fact, fallout 
from the accident was detected in every nation in the northern hemisphere. ZHORES A. MED-
VEDEV, THE LEGACY OF CHERNOBYL 220 (1990) [hereinafter Z. MEDVEDEV, in contrast to 
MEDVEDEV, supra, to represent GRIGORI MEDVEDEV]. 
69 Oleg S. Kolbasov, Ecological Disaster Area: The Chernobyl Case Study, 19 B.C. ENVTL. 
AFF. L. REV. 637, 637 (1992). 
70 MEDVEDEV, supra note 13, at 78. 
71 [d. Examples of the half-lives of these substances include a half-life of28 years for strontium 
90,30 years for caesium-137, and 24,000 years for plutonium-239. PETER GoULD, FIRE IN THE 
RAIN: THE DEMOCRATIC CONSEQUENCES OF CHERNOBYL 25 (1990). 
72 MEDVEDEV, supra note 13, at 78. A roentgen is one means of measuring levels of radioac-
tivity. To put the estimated levels at the Chernobyl site immediately after the accident in 
perspective, it is useful to consider that according to World Health Organization standards, an 
acceptable dose of radiation for members of the general popUlation is .00034 roentgen (0.34 
milliroentgen) per hour. [d. at 214. While it is true that the level of radioactivity around 
Chernobyl declined "in proportion to the square of [the] distance" from the reactor site, these 
statistics provide a frightening point of reference for an attempt to comprehend the level of 
radioactivity released by the explosions. See id. at 78. Further, in a May 6, 1986 press conference, 
Soviet officials estimated the radioactivity in the area of the reactor to be .015 roentgen per 
hour, as compared to the statistics just cited of 15,000-20,000 roentgen per hour. [d. at 79. 
One additional revealing comparison is that without even taking into account the seventy tons 
of fuel and approximately 700 tons of radioactive graphite from the reactor that settled around 
the crippled reactor complex, the fifty tons of nuclear fuel released into the atmosphere was 
equivalent to ten of the bombs used at Hiroshima at the end of World War II. [d. 
73 Snell, supra note 25, at 19. 
74 [d. 
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the thirty-one casualties who died during the first few days of the 
accident, as well as many of the over 300 victims who were initially 
hospitalized, had been firefighters called to the scene of the disaster.75 
Subsequent measures to control the site included pumping massive 
amounts of water into the reactor's cooling ponds, but this action only 
complicated the situation further by spreading contamination via the 
water.76 After it became clear that inundating the area with water was 
only exacerbating the problem, the focus of the rescue work switched 
to finding a way to absorb radioactive particles and cut off the oxygen 
which fed the graphite fire in the reactor.77 Helicopter pilots were 
brought in to drop large amounts of dolomite to produce carbon 
dioxide to smother the fire, boron carbide to absorb neutrons, and clay 
and sand to cut off oxygen.78 They also dropped lead to absorb heat 
and form a liquid layer which the clean-up teams hoped would seal 
the core when it eventually hardened.79 All of these materials dropped 
onto the core weighed more than 5,000 tons, which created a new 
danger of damaging the structure that supported the reactor and 
which prevented vast amounts of radioactive particles from entering 
the groundwater.8o Workers actually dug beneath the reactor to add 
reinforcements to the structure to prevent this from happening.81 
Although these measures succeeded in reducing the discharge of 
radiation in the short-term, these steps soon also created additional 
problems.82 Specifically, the materials which covered the reactor 
sealed the heat within it and caused the radioactive fuels to re-heat.83 
The emergency crews finally solved this serious dilemma by pumping 
liquid nitrogen into the reactor via a pipeline under the reactor room, 
thereby cooling the core and extinguishing the graphite fire.84 Next, 
crews wearing lead suits worked in sixty-second intervals to clear 
graphite pieces and other radioactive debris from the outside of the 
75 GOULD, supra note 71, at 15. To this day, the official count of immediate fatalities from 
Chernobyl stands at 31, although other reports list the death toll at significantly higher num-
bers. E.g., Wright, supra note 11, at 17A. For a discussion of such discrepancies in these and 
other statistics, see infra notes 299-302 and accompanying text. 
76 See Snell, supra note 25, at 19; MEDVEDEV, supra note 13, at 135. 
77 GOULD, supra note 71, at 17. 
78 Id. 
79 Id. 
80 Id. at 18. 
S! Id. 
82 Id. 
83 Snell, supra note 25, at 21. 
84 GOULD, supra note 71, at 18. 
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reactor, hurling them back into the reactor pit.85 Further actions 
included using remote-control bulldozers to remove radioactive top-
soil, spreading a layer of concrete on the ground to reduce radioactive 
dust, and building concrete walls deep in the soil surrounding the 
reactor to halt the spread of radionuclides into the groundwater.86 
Ultimately, in October of 1986, the Soviets constructed an enormous 
"sarcophagus," a concrete and steel structure surrounding the crip-
pled reactor to prevent further damage to the environment.87 
Unfortunately, even though the situation at the reactor had been 
stabilized temporarily, damage to humans and the environment con-
tinued. Reactor unit number three remained operating until 5:00 a.m. 
on April 26, and units one and two stayed on-line until twenty-four 
hours after the accident.88 As a result of exposure to massive doses of 
radiation, many of the workers throughout the plant complex, as well 
as the rescue workers already discussed, quickly developed severe 
symptoms.89 The earliest victims were taken to the Pripyat90 Medical 
Center for treatment, and in many cases, to await an excruciating 
death.91 
The government in Moscow had received notice of the accident at 
Chernobyl's reactor number four, and two groups of officials and 
experts left for Pripyat early on the morning of April 26.92 However, 
there had still been no public announcement regarding the accident, 
and the local residents went about their normal affairs, including 
sending their children to school.93 In fact, Soviet spokespersons later 
stated that they did not issue a formal announcement because they 
did not want residents to panic.94 However, word of a serious accident 
at the nuclear plant eventually began to spread among the population, 
85 Snell, supra note 25, at 21. See also Jackson, supra note 4, at 44. 
86 Snell, supra note 25, at 21. 
87 Z. MEDVEDEV, supra note 68, at 80. According to Soviet estimates, the construction of the 
sarcophagus would make the site safe for at least thirty years. Jackson, supra note 4, at 44. 
However, for a discussion of the uncertain fate of the sarcophagus, see infm note 50 and 
accompanying text. 
88 Z. MEDVEDEV, supra note 68, at 134. 
89Id. 
90 Pripyat is the town that directly surrounds the Chernobyl plant. Victoria Riess Hartke, 
Note, The International Fallout From Chernobyl, 5 DICK. J. INT'L L. 319, 320 (1987). 
91 For an account of conditions and witnesses' experiences at the Pripyat Medical Center, see 
generally MEDVEDEV, supra note 13, at 168-74. 
92Id. at 136--37. Although Moscow learned that there had been an accident, they were not 
initially informed of the true extent of the disaster and had specifically been told a much milder 
report of the damage from their subordinates at Chernobyl. See id. at 147-48. 
93Id. at 137. 
94 Z. ME:DVEDEV, supra note 68, at 144. 
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and many residents attempted to leave the area by car.95 Many who 
were stopped at roadblocks by soldiers instead tried to escape via the 
forest surrounding the town.96 Ironically, because of the wind direc-
tion, the forest was receiving some of the highest doses ofradiation.97 
Only after experts analyzed the reactor site from the air98 did 
officials accept what many had feared and others had vehemently 
denied: the reactor was not intact as those in charge of Chernobyl had 
claimed;99 rather, it had instead been destroyed;100 and this was indeed 
an extremely serious situation. The decision to evacuate was finally 
reached thirty-five hours after the accident, and at about noon on 
April 27 there was a radio broadcast informing area residents that 
they must leave their homes.101 Even then, there was no explanation 
of why the situation required an evacuation, and residents were told 
that they would only have to leave for a period of three daysYl2 
Officials designated the area within a thirty kilometer radius of the 
nuclear plant as the "exclusion zone," and those who lived within that 
area were evacuated. 100 
Eventually, 135,000 people104 were evacuated from the area, but 
that statistic does not account for the large number of children who 
had to be evacuated from regions well beyond the thirty kilometer 
zone, whose numbers bring the total to over 500,000 individuals.106 In 
addition, many people living in areas which were beyond the zone but 
nonetheless in the path of the radioactive cloud received accumulated 
doses of radiation as large as those received by many residents of the 
"exclusion zone."l06 But, authorities who hoped to minimize the eco-
nomic and political consequences of the disaster chose to combat the 
radiation damage by using less radical measures than further evacu-
ation.107 
95 [d.; MEDVEDEV, supra note 13, at 149. Unfortunately, those who left the town in their cars 
and scattered to various places took with them significant levels of radiation on their clothing 
and car tires. [d. 
96 [d. 
rn Z. MEDVEDEV, supra note 68, at 144. 
98 MEDVEDEV, supra note 13, at 143. 
99 See id. at 113-22. 
100 [d. at 147. 
101 MARPLES, supra note 25, at 29. 
102 [d. 
103 Z. MEDVEDEV, supra note 68, at 151. 
104 [d. at 131. In a subsequent report to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 
the Soviets changed this number from 135,000 to 115,000 without any explanation. At the same 
time, they also gave a reduced estimate of the number of Soviet citizens who had suffered 
exposure to radiation. [d. 
105 MARPLES, supra note 25, at 31. 
106 Z. MEDVEDEV, supra note 68, at 154--55. 
107 [d. 
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Even the thirty kilometer zone was not evacuated completely, as 
groups of soldiers were assigned to remain and guard the abandoned 
townsYl8 Many of them are now suffering from serious health prob-
lems as a result of their prolonged exposure. lOg Similarly, the long-
term clean-up crews at the accident site, as well as the staff at the 
other three Chernobyl reactor units which were brought back on-line 
shortly after the disaster, received lifetime doses of radiation in as 
little as ten to twelve second shifts and have also experienced adverse 
health effects yo According to official reports, a total of over 600,000 
people have been categorized as having been exposed to "significant" 
levels of radiation,111 and almost one million are part of a "monitoring 
program" under which they carry a medical identification card indi-
cating that they were exposed to radiation from the Chernobyl acci-
dent. ll2 
There are many reasons to question the accuracy of even these 
startling statistics. For example, many of the rescue workers were 
not included in these lists.113 Also, it is difficult to calculate the actual 
increase in various illnesses as a result of Chernobyl because accurate 
data on their incidence in many areas prior to 1986 are not available, 114 
current monitoring systems are still inadequate,115 and many of the 
long-term health effects of Chernobyl may not appear for years or 
have not been reported publiclyy6 Even if increases in certain ill-
nesses can be documented, there is no guarantee that they are attrib-
utable to Chernobyl in full or in part and not to other negative condi-
tions existing in the former Soviet Union, or to more thorough and 
efficient diagnostic methods recently in use.ll7 Additional problems 
arise with efforts to calculate the health effects in areas beyond the 
former Soviet Union where there was significant radioactive contami-
108 CHERNOUSENKO, supra note 65, at II. 
109 Id. 
110 GOULD, supra note 71, at 26-29. 
111 Z. MEDVEDEV, supra note 68, at 129. 
112 GOULD, supra note 71, at 30. 
113 Z. MEDVEDEV, supra note 68, at 129. 
114 Brownen Maddox, Chernobyl Death Toll Put at Forty-Two, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 15, 1993, at 
2. See infra notes 353-57 for a discussion of some of the long-term health effects that are 
beginning to emerge. 
115 See Tim Radford, Inside the Forbidden Forests, THE GUARDIAN, Nov. 18, 1993, at 12 for 
a discussion of the monitoring systems that should be utilized to track the health effects of 
Chernobyl accurately. 
116 See supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text. 
117 Ann MacLachlan, Rising Children's Thyroid Cancers Indicate Growing Chernobyl Link, 
NUCLEONICS WEEK, Sept. 10, 1992, at 1. 
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nation which could lead to health problems but whose effects would 
be even harder to prove.ns 
Aside from the incalculable human health effects, the environ-
mental devastation as a result of the disaster had also reached mas-
sive proportions by the time that the reactor burned itself out ten 
days later.ll9 According to official reports in 1990, over 100,000 square 
kilometers became severely polluted by radiation as a result of this 
accident, but to this day additional areas of contamination are being 
identified.l20 Countless millions of acres of precious farmland and for-
est were severely damaged, including 12.5 million acres of agricultural 
land and approximately four million acres of forested land in the 
Ukraine alone.121 Water supplies and fishing grounds were contami-
nated, as many lakes, rivers, and other water sources received mas-
sive doses of radioactive particles.l22 The food-chain, likewise, became 
contaminated, and despite efforts to isolate the affected products, 
these measures often fell short as a result of poor implementation, 
inadequate publicity, limited duration, and lack of available alterna-
tive food supplies.123 
Like the radioactive cloud itself, this environmental damage spread 
far beyond the territory of the Soviet Union.l24 For example, Sweden 
lost over $144 million from ruined food, most notably due to extensive 
damage to its reindeer population, which provides the economic live-
lihood for its nomadic peoples.125 In Poland, milk from cows that 
118 Z. MEDVEDEV, supra note 68, at 224-25. 
119 See supra note 69 and accompanying text. 
120 CHERNOUSENKO, supra note 65, at 1. See infra notes 348-63 for information regarding 
many recent discoveries of damage and dangers caused both by the Chernobyl accident and its 
current status. 
121 Wright, supra note 11, at 17A; Yuri Scherbak, Strategy for Survival: Problems of Legisla-
tive and Executive Pawer in the Field of Environmental Protection in the Ukraine, 19 B.C. 
ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 505, 506 (1992). The majority of the redwood pine forest near Pripyat 
actually had to be chopped down, with the radioactive portions of the trees having to be 
chemically treated and buried in concrete. MARPLES, supra note 25, at 67-ti8. 
122 See id. at 64-ti7. 
123 See id. at 62-ti3, 72-76. 
124 See, e.g., id. at 76-78. The Soviets refused to pay compensation to any other nation that 
received radioactive contamination as a result of the Chernobyl accident. Robert Gillette, 
Soviets Ready to Discuss Liability Pact for Nuclear Mishaps, L.A. TiMES, Oct. 6, 1986, at 12. 
This refusal on the part of the Soviet government, as well as the repercussions of that decision 
are discussed infra at notes 294-95, 364-78. 
125 Hartke, supra note 90, at 320; Jillian Barron, Note, After Chemobyl: Liability for Nuclear 
Accidents Under International Law, 25 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 647, 648 (1987). The Swedish 
government is still paying compensation to herders as a result of continued contamination of 
the reindeer population. Chernobyl Caesium Still Taints Swedish Reindeer Meat, REUTERS 
LIBR. REP., Nov. 5, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, International File. In fact, nine 
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grazed on contaminated grass was undrinkable, while in Great Britain 
animals who had also grazed on contaminated grass became unfit for 
human consumption.l26 Radiation damaged food products also affected 
the global agricultural economy, as countries as varied as Italy and 
Malaysia refused shipments of products such as butter, powdered 
milk, and cattle containing contaminants from other nations.127 Be-
cause the Chernobyl disaster had such far-reaching and long-term 
consequences, it is important to analyze the circumstances under 
which the accident took place before comprehensive steps can be 
taken to prevent similar or even more devastating catastrophes from 
occurring. 
III. THE SOVIET SYSTEM: How IT LEAD TO AND EXACERBATED 
THE CHERNOBYL ACCIDENT 
A. The Structure of the System Analyzed 
Communism developed out of a perception that capitalism func-
tioned by exploiting human beings and alienating them from the fruits 
of their labors and from nature.l28 Under communism, by re-estab-
lishing the true correlation between the amount of labor exerted and 
the value of the commodity created and thereby doing away with the 
artificial valuation system imposed by capitalism, human beings could 
be re-united with their true selves and with nature.129 In the words of 
Karl Marx, communism begins with the realization that: 
Man lives on nature-means that nature is his body, with which 
he must remain in continuous intercourse if he is not to die. That 
man's physical and spiritual life is linked to nature means simply 
that nature is linked to itself, for man is a part of nature. 130 
Nature is exploited when humans are deprived of their proper rela-
tionship with, and use of it.l3l If human beings can reclaim the prod-
ucts of their labor, both the alienation from, and exploitation of nature 
will end.132 The value of nature, then, is that it can serve as a tool for 
out of ten reindeer slaughtered in one village recently were deemed inedible as a result of 
radioactive contamination. [d. 
126 Hartke, supra note 90, at 320. 
127 [d. at 321; Gillette, supra note 124, at 12. 
12J3 See CHARLES E. ZIEGLER, ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY IN THE USSR 9-10 (1987). 
129 See id. at 10-11. 
130 [d. at 9. 
131 See id. at 9-10. 
132 [d. at 12. 
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humans-"man's original tool house" -to be used by society in order 
to facilitate " ... the free development of social productive powers."I33 
Under Soviet communism, pursuing productivity was advanced as 
the primary goal of society because it encouraged and enabled social 
and political development.134 When secondary goals conflicted with the 
achievement of the ultimate goal of productivity, the secondary goal 
"took the back seat."135 Also, with productivity as the priority, com-
pleting projects and filling quotas in the shortest possible period of 
time was regarded as the true measure of success.136 A given project's 
identity was defined by the period of time allotted to complete it, and 
bonuses were awarded to those who could complete the project within 
that time period or even better, within less time.137 By its very nature, 
a system tied to arbitrary deadlines regardless of the individual cir-
cumstances affecting a given project, and offering incentives only to 
those who thrive on meeting deadlines invites a sacrifice of quality 
and even safety.l38 
Another important element of the Soviet system was a centralized, 
party-run government and society.139 In order to perpetuate and jus-
tify Party rule, as well as to protect the image of communism as the 
ideal and perfect system, the Party had to appear to be the source of 
"objective truth."140 The many ministries and institutes that existed 
to facilitate this goal were required to demonstrate results conform-
ing to the "reality" that the Party chose to portray.141 And, if a direc-
tive from the Party did not yield the intended outcome, the integrity 
of the system would nonetheless remain intact because the subordi-
nate ministries and their individual members would be blamed.l42 
As a result, it became imperative not only for the Party to preserve 
the integrity of all of its policies, but also for ministry operatives who 
had a great deal to lose if the illusion were shattered in any way.l43 
133Id. at 11-12. 
134 See id. at 8, 132. 
135Id. 
136 I d. at 33. 
137Id. 
138 See id. 
139 See id. at 35. 
140 See id. at 36. 
141 Id. at 133. 
142Id. Although the basis for this analysis was taken from a book that was written before the 
Chernobyl accident, see infra notes 322-29 for a discussion of how this phenomenon is exactly 
what happened with the handling of the disaster, and in particular with the apportionment of 
responsibility. 
143 See id. at 114, 133. 
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This structure encouraged secrecy at all levels: the Party reported 
only the facts that it wanted known and that supported its version of 
reality,t44 and the bureaucratic sub-units filtered and molded the in-
formation that went to the Party leaders so as to portray an image of 
meeting Party expectations,145 and to preserve their chances ofreceiv-
ing bonuses.146 It was actually forbidden for anyone to offer criticism 
of a project once the Party had committed to a particular plan of 
action, even though certain relevant information might not have be-
come available until after the project had been approved.147 Eventu-
ally, negative consequences were bound to result when decisions at 
all levels were made in such a manner, without the benefit of accurate 
and pertinent information.148 
1. Communist Philosophy and the Environment 
The emphasis on productivity in the Soviet system had an espe-
cially large impact on the environment.149 A closer examination of how 
the earliest communist philosophers regarded the role of nature re-
veals why an emphasis on productivity and the goal of protecting the 
environment were ultimately incompatible.150 According to Karl 
Marx, "[t]he earth is not the product of labor and has no value. 
Production ahead of environmental controls."151 Because Marx be-
lieved that natural resources would never become scarce or limited 
as long as there were sophisticated methods of production and a 
valuation system that derived its determination of "value" from the 
actual amount of labor exerted, he refused to attach greater "value" 
to one commodity over another, even if the former were a natural 
resource.l52 The isolation of humans from nature occurred because of 
the alienation of humans from the products of their labor.l53 If this 
phenomenon were overcome, humans would be re-united with nature, 
but the relationship between humans and nature would be one in 
144 Id. at 31-'33. 
145 Id. at 103. 
146 Id. at 126. 
147Id. at 36. 
146 See infra notes 258-95 for examples of how the information gap contributed to and 
worsened the situation at Chernobyl. 
149 See generally id. 
150 See id. at 8-13. See also Larry 'lYe, The Scars of Pollution; Iron Curtain Rises to Reveal 
Dirt, Death, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 17, 1989, at 1P. 
161 Christine Zvosec, Environmental Deterioration in Eastern Eurape, 28 SURV. J. 117, 123 
(1984). 
162 ZIEGLER, supra note 128 at 10--1I. 
163 See supra notes 111-12 and accompanying text. 
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which humans could use nature to create a society based on effective 
production.l54 
Marx developed his philosophies largely as a result of witnessing 
great social inequities that developed with the expansion of capitalism 
and increasing industrialization.155 The focus in his works on the plight 
of the exploited common man above all other considerations is quite 
understandable given the conditions in the society in which he lived.l56 
A simultaneous lack of concern for the impact of industrial production 
on the environment also makes sense when one considers that there 
was widespread ignorance during the nineteenth century regarding 
the negative environmental effects ofpollution.157 In addition, because 
the territory of the Soviet Union contained a particularly massive 
amount of land, all generously blessed with natural resources, it was 
hard for its leaders to comprehend any limits to its use and develop-
ment,158 
While Lenin shared Marx's view of nature and the environment as 
a necessary tool to be used by humans striving to live a socialist 
existence, the ideas of another significant communist philosopher, 
Friedrich Engels, were tempered by a realization that harmony be-
tween the environment and production was not a given.l59 Indeed, he 
warned of the possible consequences of attempts to control and ma-
nipulate the environment for society's purposes: "[l]et us not, how-
ever, be very hopeful about our human conquest over nature. For each 
such victory, nature manages to take her revenge."HiO Despite his 
prophetic words which apply all too well to the Chernobyl disaster 
and other contemporary environmental problems, Engels ultimately 
had faith in the ability of communism to utilize science to create 
harmony between humanity and the environment.161 
Unfortunately, Josef Stalin took these early communist philoso-
phies regarding nature's function as a tool for society to extremesyi2 
Stalin's attempt to industrialize the Soviet economy rapidly over-
whelmed the environment's capacity to tolerate the strain.l63 Yet, 
Stalin completely ignored any negative ecological impact of his pro-
154 See supra note 113 and accompanying text. 
155 'lYe, supra note 150. 
156 Id. 
157 Id. 
158 See ZIEGLER, supra note 128, at 13, 25. 
159 I d. at 12. 
160 Id. 
161Id. 
162 Id. at 8, 24. 
163 See id. at 13, 16-21. 
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grams,I64 and even persecuted environmentalists for their attempts to 
encourage conservation measures, and to demonstrate the negative 
impact of massive industrialization on the environment.l65 
Initially, the Party avoided the issue of environmental damage 
caused by industry by denying that such pollution was possibleYi6 The 
argument was that environmental problems could not occur under 
communism because, unlike capitalism, which "externalizes" the costs 
of pollution by allowing polluters to burden their neighbors with 
clean-up expenses, communism requires that the state assume such 
costS.167 Because, in theory, the state exists for the good of all, citizens 
will act in a manner that does not burden their socialist brethren and 
that assists the state in preventing pollution from ever occurring.168 
In reality, however, this system provided little incentive for individual 
responsibility.l69 Because the Party had stated that pollution could 
never occur, it did not have to assume the burden of preventing and 
addressing environmental degradation.170 The government, further-
more, was unwilling to devote time or money to anything that inter-
fered with production.17l One final defect in the system was that one 
central entity, i.e., the state, had control over both encouraging pro-
ductivity and supervising efforts to prevent and punish any environ-
mental damage that might occur.172 rrypically, in the event of such 
conflicting obligations, "[ w ]hen the state is doer and checker, doing 
usually prevails over checking."I73 
Gradually, during the Khrushchev and Brezhnev eras, an under-
standing that unchecked industrial development was indeed having a 
negative impact on the environment began to develop.174 However, the 
role that ordinary citizens were allowed to play in establishing an 
environmental agenda remained quite limited because interested par-
ties were not permitted to form independent organizations.175 The 
164 Id. at 24. 
165 Tye, supra note 150. 
166 Marshall I. Goldman, Environmentalism and Ethnic Awakening, 19 B.C. ENVTL AFF. L. 
REV. 511, 512 (1989). 
167 Id. 
168 See id. 
169 William K Reilly, International Cooperation on the Environment: The Cleanup of Eastern 
Europe, 19 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 501, 501 (1989). 
170 Goldman, supra note 166, at 512. 
171 Id. 
1'12 Tye, supra note 150. 
173 Id. 
174 ZIEGLER, supra note 128, at 154-55. 
176 Id. at 40; Goldman, supra note 166, at 512. 
1994] LEGACY OF CHERNOBYL 727 
other potential source of ecological activism at this time would have 
been the "environmental specialists" who, however, always under the 
watchful eyes of censors, merely advocated "fine-tuning" the existing 
system and denied the need for more fundamental change.176 
Under the leadership of Mikhail Gorbachev, there was increasing 
acknowledgement that the massive Soviet bureaucracy required an 
overhaul,177 but many of Gorbachev's early attempts seemed more like 
rhetoric than serious attempts to change the fundamental structure 
of the system that remained strongly influenced by the legacy of 
Stalinism.178 While it is true that when Gorbachev came to power, he 
allowed for increased free expression and even permitted the forma-
tion of informal independent groups to address such issues as the 
environment,179 it is important to remember that the Chernobyl dis-
aster occurred during Gorbachev's tenure.180 This accident demon-
strated the persistence of the tradition of emphasizing productivity 
at all costs, of employing secrecy, altering vital statistics, and engag-
ing in scapegoating.181 
2. Law on the Books vs. Law in Practice 
An additional relevant characteristic of the Soviet system which 
contributed to the occurrence of environmental crises, including the 
Chernobyl accident, is a disparity between the written laws that exist 
"on the books" and the de facto laws that were followed in practice.U!2 
Because Party control over all aspects of society was neCE:ssary in 
order to protect the illusion that the communist system was perfect,l83 
regulation via laws was an important tool for guaranteeing that the 
Party's authority went unchallenged, and for creating the image and 
identity of the society that it hoped to project.184 It logically followed 
176 ZIEGLER, supra note 128, at 40-44, 155. 
177Id. at 100. 
178Id. at 25; Sergei Zplygin, A Brief Sumrrw,ry of the Reparl "Ideology and Ecology," 19 B.C. 
ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 635, 635 (1989). 
179 Goldman, supra note 166, at 512-13. 
180 See ZIEGLER, supra note 128, at 1644i5. 
181 See, e.g., id. 
182 Maimon Schwarzschild, Variations on an Enigrrw,: Law in Practice and Law on the Books 
in the USSR, 99 HARV. L. REV. 685, 686 (1986) (reviewing OLYMPIAD S. IOFFE.AND PETER B. 
MAGGS, SOVIET LAW IN THEORY AND PRACTICE (1983), W.E. BUTLER, SOVIET LAW (1983». 
183 See supra note 140 and accompanying text. 
184 Schwarlrilchild, supra note 182, at 687-88, 694; ZIEGLER, supra note 128, at 78, 156. When 
examining Soviet law, it is important to realize that the general purpose of its legal system was 
quite different from that of the legal system in the United States. Whereas American laws are 
largely designed to provide a means of resolving disputes between different parties, the goal of 
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that since laws existed to serve the interests of the state, the state 
itself was immune to the laws that it created.l85 In addition, individual 
Party members were exempt from criminal prosecution, as long as 
the Party decided not to expel them upon their being accused of some 
wrongdoing. 186 
A common trait of Soviet statutes was that they were often vague 
and extremely broad.187 This phenomenon makes sense when one 
considers that Party leaders actually utilized other unpublicized 
"sources" of law including regulations, administrative orders and in-
structions to various ministries to achieve the results that they de-
sired.188 In fact, most of what actually functioned as law was never 
made available to the public, and only those within government circles 
had access to such information.l89 Further, how a written law was 
enforced often did not correspond with the language or intent of the 
statute itself, and many policies were enforced when there was no 
"law on the books."190 The statutes that did exist, therefore, were 
often nothing more than examples of lofty rhetoric designed to create 
a certain impression.191 Under this system, the role of judges and 
courts was almost completely symbolic and both served merely as 
pawns to be manipulated by the bureaucracy.192 
This disparity between codified law and practiced law was particu-
larly prevalent with environmental law. 193 When the Soviet govern-
ment finally had to admit the existence of pollution and other envi-
ronmental problems,194 the government became quite ambitious about 
enacting strict environmentallegislation.195 For example, the USSR's 
Constitution of 1977 even contained a specific provision stating the 
government's commitment to protecting natural resources and the 
the Soviet legal system was to establish ideals that mirrored and protected the government's 
goals. [d. at 155--56. 
185 Schwarzschild, supra note 182, at 688. 
186 [d. at 690. For the details of what happened to the Party members who were prosecuted 
as a result of Chernobyl, see infra notes 322-29 and accompanying text. 
187 [d. at 691. 
188 [d. 
189 [d. at 695. 
190 [d. at 689. 
191 See id. at 687 --E8. 
192 Elena Kirillova, Environmental Law in the New Soviet Union, BNA INTL ENVTL. DAlLY, 
Nov. 6, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, International File. 
193 [d.; ZIEGLER, supra note 128, at 81, 93. 
194 See supra note 149 and accompanying text. 
195 See ZIEGLER, supra note 128, at 81-84, 90. 
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overall environment.1OO Yet, again these laws suffered the problems of 
vagueness and unenforceability characteristic of most Soviet legisla-
tion.197 
These problems were prevalent with environmental laws because 
environmental considerations frequently conflict with the realization 
of desired levels of industrial output.1OO This tension was so common 
because industry's excessive use of natural resources often leads to 
ecological problems.199 As discussed earlier, whenever there was a 
conflict between the goal of maximum productivity and another noble 
aim, productivity would always win.2°O Because the emphasis on pro-
duction was so fundamental to the Soviet vision and therefore largely 
dictated its structure, environmental laws were never intended to 
change the system significantly.201 Rather, they served primarily to 
provide an image of balance and accomplishment for communism.202 
Given this limited and unrealistic purpose, it is no wonder that envi-
ronmentallegislation did not have a large impact on the system.2OO 
One final trait of Soviet environmental laws that prevents them 
from having any large-scale impact was that the majority oflaws were 
only enforced against individuals and usually only for minor viola-
tions.204 Also, it was very easy for individual violators to avoid pun-
ishment or receive only minor fines that might not even be collected 
because many people were able to use connections to avoid any pen-
alty.205 Others were let off easily by inefficient agencies who did not 
have the same prosecutorial zeal or capacity found in bona fide court 
systems.206 Ultimately, it was the state that controlled the industries 
that were likely to cause environmental harm,207 and the state was 
196 USSR CONST. OF 1977 art. 18 states: 
In the interests of present and future generations in the USSR necessary measures 
shall be taken for the protection and scientifically well-founded, rational use of land 
and its minerals, water resources, flora and fauna, for the preservation of air and water 
purity, for ensuring the production of natural wealth, and improvement of the human 
environment. 
197 See, e.g., Kirillova, supra note 192. 
198 See ZIEGLER, supra note 128, at 13. 
199 See supra note 163 and accompanying text. 
200 See supra note 135 and accompanying text. 
201 See ZIEGLER, supra note 128, at 156. 
2021d. 
203 See id. 
204 Kirillova, supra note 192. 
206 ZIEGLER, supra note 128, at 90, 100. 
2061d. 
207 See supra note 139 and accompanying text. 
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immune from prosecution.208 Even if the government were to be im-
plicated in an environmental crisis, there were always scapegoats 
readily available to prove the fallibility of humans and the infallibility 
of the communist state.209 
B. The Nuclear Industry in the Soviet Union 
The Soviet command economy also directly influenced the develop-
ment and focus of the nuclear industry. There was a long tradition of 
secrecy surrounding the nuclear energy industry in the Soviet U n-
ion.210 This secrecy provided the government with the ability to cover 
up countless mishaps and even several incidents that could be char-
acterized as "disasters."211 These cover-ups kept information not only 
from the public and segments of the government, but also from work-
ers at the nuclear plants.212 Concealing this information from plant 
personnel was particularly significant because a perception that noth-
ing ever goes wrong encourages an attitude of complacency.213 
The government contributed to this complacency through a propa-
ganda campaign to convince the entire society that nuclear power was 
completely safe.214 In 1980, a member of the Soviet Academy of Sci-
ences, M.A. Styrikovich declared in a magazine article, "[n]uclear 
power stations are like stars that shine all day long! We shall sow 
them all over the land. They are perfectly safe."215 The director of the 
200 See supra note 185 and accompanying text. 
200 See supra note 142 and accompanying text. 
210 ZIEGLER, supra note 128, at 39. 
211 [d. In 1958, there was a large explosion at the Cheliabinsk plant, which was caused by 
radioactive waste products and which led to the contamination of over 1,500 square kilometers. 
The Soviet government never acknowledged this accident openly. [d. For examples of additional 
nuclear accidents in the Soviet Union, see MEDVEDEV, supra note 13, at 17-19. 
212 [d. at 20. 
213 [d. 
214 See id. at 2. 
215 [d. The United States has also engaged in a similar campaign. The U.S. government 
performed tests of atomic bombs over the Nevada desert for a period of several years during 
the 19508. At one point, the government made a film which was distributed to residents of 
neighboring areas and which declared unequivocally that there was no danger of exposure to 
radiation as a result of the testing. The government made this statement even though it had 
evidence indicating that there was indeed a health risk for area residents. Countless residents 
of the areas downwind from the test sites have suffered severe illnesses, including leukemia and 
other cancers, that are likely linked to their exposure to radiation from the testing. Turning 
Point: The Caver Up at Ground Zero (ABC television broadcast, Feb. 2, 1994). 
This phenomenon also occurred with the nuclear energy industry in the United States. See 
generally LOUIS GWIN, SPEAK No EVIL (1990). Despite the systematic differences between the 
Soviet Union and the United States, there was a widespread use of rhetoric to promote the use 
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Physico-Energy Institute also claimed that storing nuclear wastes 
would be a simple, innocuous task.216 The aftermath of Chernobyl and 
continuing efforts to find adequate storage for the contaminated ma-
terials demonstrate that these were unsubstantiated and misleading 
claims.217 
This unbridled enthusiasm was not merely a matter of officials' 
being naive about the risks of nuclear energy. On May 19, 1985, the 
Minister of Energy, Anatoly Mayorets, signed an order which stated, 
"[i]nformation about the unfavorable ecological impact of energy-re-
lated facilities ... on operational personnel, the population, and the 
environment shall not be reported openly in the press or broadcast 
on radio or television."218 Given the dual system of laws discussed 
above, this "order" not to disseminate vital information effectively 
assumed the status of law.219 Officials such as Mayorets may not have 
been naive, but they were not as knowledgeable as they needed to be 
in order to run the nation's nuclear industry.220 
There are two main reasons for the inadequate comprehension of 
the complexities of nuclear energy among many of the industry heads. 
First, because the nuclear energy industry was regarded as prestig-
ious within the Party, positions that had once been filled by individuals 
with extensive educations in nuclear science were gradually being 
assumed by well-connected but largely unknowledgeable individuals 
attracted to the exciting new industry.221 Second, there was a wide-
of nuclear energy at the expense of safety considerations in both countries, with a remarkably 
similar impact on how their nuclear industries operated. See id. at xiv. In the United States, 
federal regulatory bodies resist becoming involved in disseminating information regarding the 
possible risks accompanying the use of nuclear energy, preferring to allow the industry to 
control the information revealed to the public and thereby create its own image. See id. at xiv., 
17. Of course, the nuclear industry itself clearly has an incentive to emphasize the positive rather 
than negative aspects of nuclear power. See id. at 150. 
Even the IAEA has struggled with the dual identity challenge of encouraging the use of 
nuclear energy worldwide while simultaneously working to insure its safety, and many critics 
charge that the Agency's priority seems to be the advancement of the nuclear industry at the 
expense of an emphasis on safety. See BORIS SEGERSTAHL, CHERNOBYL: A POLICY RESPONSE 
STUDY 88,103--04 (1991). See infra note 391 and accompanying text for an example of the IAEA's 
outlook as revealed by its somewhat complacent attitude toward the extent of damage and 
danger that still persists as a result of Chemobyl. 
216 MEDVEDEV, supra note 13, at 2. 
217 [d. See infra notes 348--{)0, 357--{)9 for a discussion of current problems with containing the 
radioactive waste from Chemobyl. 
218 [d. at 20. 
219 See supra notes 182-85 and accompanying text. 
220 See MEDVEDEV, supra note 13, at 21. 
221 [d. at 9. 
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spread perception among high officials that nuclear energy was very 
simple to understand and to manage.222 As a result, individuals with 
no background in nuclear science were put in charge of running the 
entire program.223 An example of this incompetence was Minister 
Mayorets, who, immediately upon assuming his new position, dis-
banded the research and design committee within the Ministry of 
Energy, which had been made up of individuals who could have pro-
vided him with the necessary scientific background to appreciate his 
task.224 
Mayorets and others like him were, however, well-versed in how to 
succeed politically as administrators within the Soviet system.225 The 
new Minister of Energy soon reduced the amount of maintenance and 
back-up power at the nation's nuclear plants, thereby increasing pro-
duction but also increasing the chances of a major accident.2ai This 
move pleased Mayorets' superiors so much that they commended him 
for his efforts,227 allowing once again the predictable outcome of any 
conflict between production and environmental or other concerns: 
production wins.228 
Hand-in-hand with the decision to increase the production of en-
ergy by cutting back on safety measures came a decision to push up 
deadlines for bringing new plants on-line without any attention to 
relevant technical considerations.229 One final element that fit all too 
neatly into the pattern established under the Soviet system was a 
refusal on the part of highly-ranked officials to listen to advice or 
criticism of any decision that had already been made.230 When, just 
two months before the Chernobyl accident, a worker challenged the 
feasibility and wisdom of a premature start-up date, his superiors 
accused him of being insubordinate and incompetent.231 In reality, he 
was extremely perceptive and accurately predicted things to come: 
"[t]here you have our whole national tragedy in a nutshell. We our-
222 Id. at 20-2l. 
228 Id. at 21, 24. 
224 Id. 
225 Id. 
226 Id. 
2Z/ Id. 
228 See supra note 135 and accompanying text. 
229 MEDVEDEV, supra note 13, at 21-22. See also supra note 136 and accompanying text. 
230 See supra note 147 and accompanying text for a discussion of how pressure to meet 
arbitrary deadlines was inherent in the system. 
231 MEDVEDEV, supra note 13, at 22. 
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selves tell lies, and we teach our subordinates to lie. Lies, even for a 
worthy cause, are still lies. And no good will come of it."232 
C. How the Soviet System Affected Events at Chernobyl's Reactor 
Number Four 
1. Pre-Disaster 
A nuclear energy industry run by Minister Mayorets and others 
with similar philosophies about the role of nuclear power provided the 
backdrop for the events at the number four reactor at the Chernobyl 
plant. 
There had been warnings about the safety of the RMBK reactors' 
design from scientists at the Kurchatov Institute of Technology as 
early as the 1970's.233 The more than thirty flaws they described 
included the design of the control rods and the instability of the 
reactor unit when it was reduced to low power.234 Yet, typically, at 
least one individual was relieved of his position for trying to alert 
officials to the dangers of the RMBK design.235 
In the Soviet Union at that time, there was another type of reactor, 
the VVER pressurized water reactor, which did not pose the safety 
problems that existed with the RMBK.236 But, officials did not heed 
the recommendation to construct the Chernobyl plant according to 
the VVER design, and also missed a subsequent opportunity to 
switch the reactor over to a VVER design.237 In fact, by the time of 
the Chernobyl accident in 1986, there were a total of twenty-seven 
RMBK design reactors in operation, including the four units at Cher-
nobyl.238 
In addition to the defects in the design of the reactor, there were 
problems with Chernobyl's plant workers, who were both poorly 
trained and dangerously careless.239 The plan for the experiment 
which was to take place on April 25240 had been designed by the head 
232 [d. at 23. 
233 David R. Marples, introductian to GRIGORI MEDVEDEV, No BREATHING ROOM 11 (1993). 
234 [d. See supra notes 35-64 and accompanying text for a description of how those very flaws 
played a significant role in causing the disaster. 
235 [d. 
236 MEDVEDEV, supra note 13, at 61-62. 
237 [d. at 63. 
238 Snell, supra note 25, at 4. 
239 Tye, supra note 150. See MEDVEDEV, supra note 13, at 36. 
240 The test was delayed for nine hours because of an electricity shortage, and resumed early 
in the morning of April 26. Snell, supra note 25, at 13. 
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engineer, N.M. Fomin.241It was scheduled to proceed even though the 
Chernobyl officials had not received the requisite approval from 
higher officials.242 Apparently, the Nuclear Safety Committee had 
never bothered to respond to the proposal for the plan, and the people 
at Chernobyl had never followed up on their original request.243 This 
behavior demonstrates the widespread indifference to nuclear indus-
try safety measures, and to laws in general.244 
Because they were not adequately educated about the workings of 
a nuclear reactor, the operators mistakenly concluded that certain 
emergency systems could have caused a major problem during the 
accident, when in fact the systems actually would have helped prevent 
the accident.245 When another mistake by the operator caused the 
power to sink to a dangerously low level,246 the man in charge of the 
control room that evening, Anatoly Dyatlov,247 made an even larger 
error by ordering the reactor power to be increased again rather than 
opting to delay the experiment for twenty-four hours as he should 
have.248 When the operator realized that Dyatlov was mistaken, he 
attempted to challenge his superior's fatal judgement call but was 
soon intimidated into silence and obedience.249 The sacred rule not to 
question authority had been so deeply ingrained in him that he could 
not follow his own instincts.25o In his attempt to increase the power 
according to Dyatlov's instructions, the operator removed an inappro-
priately high number of control rods, which set the stage for the 
power surge that was to follow.251 Ultimately, it became clear how 
little the men in the control room actually understood about the 
workings of nuclear reactors, because even on their deathbeds, they 
could not comprehend that they had done anything wrong.252 
In addition to the many warnings of problems with the RMBK 
reactors and with the structure of the nuclear industry, there was an 
241 MEDVEDEV, supra note 13, at 32. 
242 [d. at 36. 
243 [d. 
244 [d. at 36, 39. See supra notes 187-97 and accompanying text for a discussion of the lax 
enforcement and observation of laws. 
245 See supra note 33 and accompanying text. 
246 See supra note 35 and accompanying text. 
247 MEDVEDEV, supra note 13, at 51. 
248 See supra note 37 and accompanying text. 
249 MEDVEDEV, supra note 13, at 55. 
250 See supra notes 147-48 and accompanying text. 
251 See supra notes 57--QO and accompanying text. 
252 MEDVEDEV, supra note 13, at 61. For a summary of all the mistakes and violations of 
existing nuclear safety laws on the part of the operators, see id. at 58-59. 
1994] LEGACY OF CHERNOBYL 735 
eerie omen just prior to the disaster. During the early spring of 1986, 
a journalist from Pripyat wrote an article criticizing many of the 
problems with the Chernobyl reactor and referring to the plant as "an 
accident waiting to happen."253 Not surprisingly, she was ignored by 
industry officials and nearly thrown out of the Party, but she was 
absolutely correct. 
2. Post-Disaster 
The pervasive attitudes regarding the nuclear industry and how to 
succeed in the Soviet system in general had an enormous influence on 
how staff members prepared for, and reacted to possible mishaps at 
Chernobyl. To begin with, the Chernobyl plant had been improperly 
equipped to handle a disaster. For example, there were only a couple 
of pitifully inadequate radiation detector units on hand, since no one 
imagined that there would ever be a need for a high-powered device 
capable of measuring large amounts of radiation.254 The one powerful 
detector on site was locked away in a safe that quickly and perma-
nently became buried by the debris from the explosions.255 Similarly, 
there were very few respirators and articles of protective clothing 
available for workers to wear should the need arise.256 Of course, given 
that nuclear energy was "absolutely safe" and that accidents never 
happened, there was little need to have such equipment on hand.257 
Almost immediately after the explosions occurred at reactor num-
ber four, there was a series of actions by officials at many different 
levels which are consistent with the patterns established within the 
structure of the Soviet system, and which increased the level of 
damage significantly.258 For example, Dyatlov quickly developed a 
scenario of what happened which he and many others clung to for 
several days: the reactor was still intact and the explosions had only 
been gas explosions that occurred in the emergency protection and 
control system tank.259 His reaction was not surprising given his mis-
interpretation of what was happening to the reactor prior to, and 
during the experiment, and his subsequent errors.260 In fact, it was 
not a surprising reaction for anyone working in the Soviet nuclear 
253 Marples, supra note 233, at 14-15. 
254 MEDvEDEV, supra note 13, at 100-01. 
255 [d. at 115. 
256 [d. at 102. 
257 See supra notes 214-15 and accompanying text. 
258 See, e.g., MEDVEDEv, supra note 13, at 93. 
259 [d. at 93, 95, 113, 116, 120. 
260 See supra notes 246-52 and accompanying text. 
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energy program because it provided an easy answer which did not 
require questioning the entire make-up of the industry.261 Moreover, 
this version did not require Dyatlov or anyone else responsible for 
operations at Chernobyl to examine their own culpability for the 
disaster.262 This is also probably why so many other officials were so 
willing to accept Dyatlov's version of what happened.263 Because of 
the nature of the accident that Dyatlov believed had occurred, he took 
steps to force water into the reactor core in order to cool it down.264 
As a result of these unnecessary and inappropriate measures, addi-
tional people were exposed to radiation, and the steps taken actually 
made matters worse by allowing the contamination to spread un-
checked.265 
The plant director at Chernobyl, V.P. Bryukhanov,266 displayed simi-
larly flawed logic in refusing to allow the operators at unit three to 
shut down the reactor.267 Fortunately, the shift foreman at unit three 
was courageous and wise enough to disobey his orders and shut down 
the reactor on his own, thereby preventing it from melting, and also 
to supply his staff with potassium iodide pills and respirators to 
combat the radiation that was inundating the area.268 Bryukhanov, on 
the other hand, refused to accept the gravity of the situation, instead 
choosing to believe that high radiation measurements that over-
loaded the low-level detection instruments must have been attribut-
able to faulty equipment and not to a serious release of radiation.269 
Bryukhanov even refused to believe the words of an eye witness who 
was specifically sent to check on the status of the reactor and who 
found it completely destroyed, angrily rejecting the young engineer's 
story and clinging to the myth of the intact reactor.270 The engineer's 
mission therefore had been in vain, and he soon died as a result of his 
exposure to massive amounts of radiation.271 
For some unknown reason and despite his unwillingness to accept 
the gravity of the situation, Bryukhanov nonetheless wisely recom-
mended evacuating Pripyat as a precaution.272 But, the phenomenon 
'", 
261 MEDVEDEV, supra note 13, at 93. 
262 Id. 
263 See id. 
264 Id. at 104. 
266 Id. 
266 Id. at 36. 
267 Id. at 106. 
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of transforming a given fiction into the official version of "reality" had 
taken hold of even more powerful officials whose opinions had broader 
influence and who were more difficult to contradict.273 The deputy 
chairman of the Council of Ministers, Boris Shcherbina,274 quickly 
rejected the suggestion of evacuation as unnecessary and unwise.275 
Therefore, as has been discussed, the evacuations did not take place 
for almost thirty-six hours after the accident occurred nor were resi-
dents of surrounding area officially informed of the accident and its 
implications.276 
Shcherbina explained that he did not want to start a panic.277 If he 
were responsible for allowing panic to occur, even his prestigious 
position might not protect him from criticism or worse from his supe-
riors. Leading the public to believe that a serious accident had oc-
curred would shatter the image of the perfect industrialized socialist 
society.278 He preferred to pass-off responsibility and let the govern-
ment commission that was on its way to Chernobyl to make that risky 
decision.279 But, a decision for early notification and rapid evacuations 
could have played a vital role in reducing the number of people ex-
posed to radiation.280 Children would not have been sent to school nor 
permitted to play outside.281 The stores would not have remained 
open, and large numbers of people would not have been outside en-
joying the beautiful spring weather.282 Furthermore, residents could 
have been given potassium iodide tablets to reduce the effects of the 
radiation on their bodies.283 
Yet, even after officials conceded that the reactor had indeed been 
destroyed,284 they hesitated to order an evacuation.285 One perceptive 
member of the government commission summarized his impressions 
of the reasons for the near paralysis on the part of the decisionmakers: 
It seemed that all those responsible for the disaster were anxious 
to delay as long as possible the awful moment of reckoning, when 
the truth would be disclosed in all its details. They were really 
273 See id. 
274 [d. at 21. 
275 [d. at 135. 
276 See supra notes 93-103 and accompanying text. 
'Z17 MEDVEDEV, supra note 13, at 135. 
278 See supra notes 149-58,210-13 and accompanying text. 
279 MEDVEDEV, supra note 13, at 135. 
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281 See id. at 28. 
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acting as they had always done at Chernobyl, hoping that the bad 
news would announce itself, and that responsibility and blame 
would somehow be spread imperceptibly and quietly over every-
one. This accounts for their studied slowness, at a time when each 
minute was precious, when delay caused the criminal exposure of 
innocent residents to radiation .... 286 
Although his observations may have been correct, this analysis 
certainly had broader applications than only to officials at Chernobyl. 
Even after the initial evacuations, no one in the government made an 
announcement regarding the disaster, and the majority of the public 
remained ignorant.287 A May Day parade in neighboring Kiev on 
March 1 went on as scheduled, even though a radioactive rain fell on 
thousands of children who were participating.288 Furthermore, the 
damage was not contained within the Soviet Union's borders.289 In 
fact, the only reason that the entire world learned of the accident was 
because workers at a Swedish nuclear plant noticed increased levels 
of radiation at the plant that they were eventually able to trace to 
Chernobyl.290 After Finland and Poland also detected radically in-
creased levels of radioactivity in the atmosphere, the Swedish ambas-
sador to the Soviet Union pressed for an explanation.291 The Soviets 
finally made an announcement, but it consisted only of three sentences 
describing a fire at the Chernobyl plant.292 Mikhail Gorbachev did not 
make a public statement regarding the disaster until eighteen days 
after it had occurred.293 Although the Soviets eventually admitted that 
there had been an accident at Chernobyl, they refused to pay any 
compensation, even to foreign countries whose people and environ-
ment received significant radiation.294 The justification for this refusal 
286 Id. at 161. 
287 Wright, supra note 11. 
288 Id. 
289 See supra notes 124-27 and accompanying text for a summary of transboundary damage 
resulting from the Chernobyl accident. 
290 Hartke, supra note 90, at 319 n.2; GOULD, supra note 71, at 42. 
291Id. at 23. 
292 Id. 
292 ZIEGLER, supra note 128, at 164. The Soviets certainly did not have a monopoly on secrecy 
when it came to the issue of radiation releases caused by the use of nuclear power. For example, 
in 1957, there was a fire at the Wind scale nuclear power plant in Great Britain which was kept 
from the public for three days, and whose ultimate impact was kept stifled by a secrecy act. 
DAVID R. MARPLES, UKRAINE UNDER PERESTROIKA 97 (1991); GOULD, supra note 71, at 17. 
This less widely-publicized fire took three days to extinguish, and eventually led to the release 
of large amounts of radiation. Id. This incident was also only brought to light because the Dutch 
detected excessive radiation in the atmosphere and protested vocally to the British government. 
Id. 
In addition, during the 1950s, the United States government deliberately kept information 
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was that the majority of costs incurred by other countries as a result 
of Chernobyl were actually attributable to their over-reacting to the 
accident and spending large amounts of money to take unnecessary 
precautions.295 
This phenomenon of attempting to minimize the effects of the dis-
aster296 had serious repercussions within the Soviet Union as well.297 
In fact, many people are willing to attribute most of the problems 
immediately following the accident and continuing today to the 
grossly inaccurate official version of the "true" consequences of Cher-
nobyl and the official actions taken as a result of that version.298 Some 
examples of these efforts are as follows: There are widespread reports 
that far more people were killed and severely injured than the gov-
ernment was willing to admit.299 This disparity is not insignificant: The 
official number of deaths is still listed at thirty-one,3oo but many dif-
ferent sources maintain that over 8,000 people in the Ukraine alone 
were killed as a result of the accident.301 If the government were 
unwilling to acknowledge the true number of injured and dead, it is 
unclear how it intended to address current and future problems faced 
by those who have significant medical needs. Further, there is evi-
dence that many additional people living in areas beyond the 30 
kilometer exclusion zone also should have been evacuated, but be-
cause they have not been evacuated, they continue to live in contami-
nated areas.302 Food regulations aimed at controlling and eliminating 
contamination of the food chain were also inadequate and were 
quickly abandoned, leaving vast amounts of radioactive food products 
regarding the effects of the radiation being released from nuclear bombs being tested in the 
Nevada from residents who lived near the test sites. See supra note 215 and accompanying text. 
294 Gillette, supra note 124, at 12. 
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297 MARPLES, supra note 25, at 57. 
298Id. 
299 See supra notes 75, 104-16 and accompanying text. 
300Id. 
301 Violations Up Twenty-three Percent at Ukraine Nuclear Plants, REUTERS LIBR. REP., 
Jan. 18,1994, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, International File [hereinafter Violations Up 
Twenty-three Percent]. 
302 See supra notes 1O~ 10 and accompanying text. See also Mike Edwards, Ukraine: Running 
on Empty, NAT'L GEOGRAPHIC, Mar., 1993, at 47. 
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in circulation.303 Efforts to limit the spread of radioactivity in the 
environment were likewise plagued by delays, poor planning, and 
methods which were not adequately extensive or long-term.3M Finally, 
after making minor modifications in the operation of the remaining 
Chernobyl units, Soviet officials expressing full confidence brought 
them quickly back on line.305 This action demonstrated a continuing 
refusal to look beyond the "quick fix" to a more substantive examina-
tion of the reasons why the Chernobyl accident occurred in the first 
place. 
IV. CHERNOBYL'S ROLE IN BRINGING ABOUT SOCIAL AND 
POLITICAL CHANGE 
On December 8, 1991, the leaders of Russia, the Ukraine, and 
Byelorussia declared the Soviet Union dissolved and established a 
loose confederation called the Commonwealth of Independent 
States.305 The Soviet Union's demise followed quickly on the heels of 
the failed coup by communists in August of 1991,307 but many people 
believe that its roots can be traced to the public reaction to the 
Chernobyl accident and its aftermath, and to concern over environ-
mental issues in general. 308 In the words of Roman So1chanyk, "[i]n 
short, for Ukranians, Chernobyl became identified with the duplicity 
and failure, indeed the complete bankruptcy of the Soviet system as 
a whole. It also served to mobilize large masses of people against that 
system."309 Therefore, although Soviet citizens had long tolerated 
their lack of significant influence over political matters in general and 
environmental issues in particular, and although some progress had 
been made in the early Gorbachev years,310 the Chernobyl disaster 
provided the catalyst that brought not only the "Green Movement" 
to the forefront but also people's desire for a say in how their country 
was run.311 
303 See supra note 123 and accompanying text. 
3M See MARPLES, supra note 25, at 63-68. 
305 Id. at 92, 204-05. These units were actually re-started even before the sarcophagus sur-
rounding the remains of unit 4 was completed, indicating that the Soviets regarded bringing 
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As a result of widespread discontent within the Soviet Union and 
persistent criticism from the global community, the legislature did 
enact a series of laws intended to deal with the consequences of 
Chernobyl and other environmental problems.312 These included laws 
with such important and ambitious names as "On the Special Protec-
tion of Individuals Who Are Victims of the Chernobyl Accident,"313 
"On the Status of the Territories Contaminated with Radionuclides 
as Result of the Chernobyl Disaster,"314 "On Environmental Protec-
tion,"315 and "Declaration on Human and Civic Rights and Liber-
ties."316 However, these laws proved not much more effective than the 
many environmental laws that were already on the books prior to the 
period of glasnost.317 For example, the laws were often written in very 
broad terms and included vague phrases such as "environmental sov-
ereignty," "environmental crime," and "zone of economic catastrophe" 
that were never specifically defined.3Is These same laws lacked effec-
tive enforcement provisions, and were not often put into practice 
because of financial limitations and the resistance of industry and 
Party leaders to allow real change in the system.319 Among the most 
significant and unfortunate failures of the new legislation is that much 
of the promised monetary compensation to Chernobyl victims was 
either insufficient or never materialized.320 In addition, many of the 
victims have not been re-settled in new areas with new housing as 
had been promised.321 
A very clear example of how the legal system continued to operate 
in the same way it always had functioned exists in how responsibility 
for the accident at Chernobyl was determined.322 In July, 1987, the 
officials who had been in charge of the Chernobyl plant were put on 
tria1.323 To begin with, the press was only permitted to attend a tiny 
312 See Kolbasov, supra note 69, at 638; Scherbak, supra note 121, at 507. 
313 Kolbasov, supra note 69, at 638. 
314 Scherbak, supra note 121, at 507. 
315Id. 
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320 MARPLES, supra note 25, at 197. 
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ITAR-TASS, available in FBIS-SOV-92--D99, May 21,1992. 
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and insignificant portion of the proceedings.324 One Western reporter 
dubbed the organization of the trial as "selective glasnost."325 
On trial were six defendants including Bryukhanov and Dyatlov, 
who were charged with violating safety procedures and who each 
received sentences of ten years in prison.326 Based on our knowledge 
and previous discussion of their actions, it was clear that they had 
indeed breached safety rules,327 but the true relevance of the trial was 
that it concluded that only a few individuals had been responsible for 
the disaster.328 The integrity of the Party had again been preserved 
because finding scapegoats from among ministry personnel proved 
very easy and effective in preventing any blame from falling on the 
Party.329 
But staged events such as the trial and the largely symbolic rheto-
ric contained within the new environmental laws were not fooling 
many people who were no longer willing to accept the word of the 
Party as law. As a result, they sought action instead of a reliance on 
mere words, as evidenced by widespread demonstrations that began 
as protests of the pitiful status of the environment and its impact on 
humans and eventually assumed a highly political flavor.330 As people 
in the republics began to identify their environmental problems with 
long-standing policies implemented by Moscow, nationalist sentiment 
increased rapidly.33l During its 1990 session, the Ukrainian Supreme 
Soviet declared its sovereignty,332 and on December 8, 1991, Russia, 
the Ukraine, and Byelorussia officially declared the demise of the 
Soviet Union. 333 
V. THE EFFECT OF ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL REALITIES 
Despite the remarkable achievement of the members of the Com-
monwealth of Independent States in obtaining sovereignty, many of 
the young Republics' ambitious goals, including conquering their 
many environmental problems such as Chernobyl, are now being 
compromised by the major challenges caused by economic334 and po-
324 ld. at 118-19. 
3&\ I d. at 118. 
326 ld. at 119-20, 123. 
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333 Schmemann, supra note 3, at 1A. 
334 See, e.g., Joliusz Urbanowicz, Ukraine: Dancing with Disaster, THE WARSAW VOICE, Dec. 
19, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, International File. 
1994] LEGACY OF CHERNOBYL 743 
litical instability.335 The economy in the Ukraine is on the verge of 
collapse, with hyperinflation that threatens to cause social uprisings.336 
The costs of dealing with the continuing effects of Chernobyl strap 
the economy even further.337 But cutting back on industries that 
threaten to cause similar crises would mean the elimination of pre-
cious jobs, a result that would be devastating to the economy and the 
stability of the government.338 As a result, the "Green Movement" is 
quickly losing its popularity.339 People are now more worried about 
immediate survival than longer-term problems such as environmental 
pollution.340 
The many additional environmental laws passed by the Ukrainian 
parliament are, therefore, now suffering the same fate that similar 
laws faced in the Soviet Union: they look good on paper but are not 
being enforced.341 This result has occurred partly because a significant 
number of leaders in the Ukraine today were actually in power before 
the break-up of the Soviet Union, and fall easily back on their old 
ways, especially in the face of crises.342 And, given the current level 
of economic hardship, these leaders are in a good position to mount 
opposition to the reforms that have contributed to the economic in-
stability.343 One recent move that, although appearing to be a prag-
matic decision, reflects this trend was a recent decision by the Ukrain-
ian parliament not to implement its plan to close down the remaining 
reactor units at Chernobyl and not to honor a 1991 moratorium on 
building additional nuclear reactors.344 
In many ways, this move was understandable when one considers 
the day-to-day pressures faced by the Ukrainian government. For 
example, the Ukraine already owes a significant debt to Russia for 
gas and oil it needs to provide energy, and Russia now refuses to 
continue subsidizing prices for these products.345 This development 
forces the Ukrainians to become even more dependent on nuclear 
335 [d.; MEDVEDEV, supra note 205, at 27. 
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energy,346 and the government even claims that without keeping Cher-
nobyl operating, it does not have enough energy reserves to make it 
through the winter.347 
Despite the dire economic conditions, the Ukraine's decision is par-
ticularly alarming given the emergence of frightening information 
regarding the continuing effects of, and continuing threats posed by 
Chernobyl and the rest of the Ukrainian nuclear industry.348 A recent 
report by an MIT graduate student who spent eighteen months 
studying the Chernobyl site contains findings revealing that the ex-
tent of damage went far beyond any earlier reports because there was 
actually a complete meltdown of the reactor during the accident; the 
several thousand tons of materials supposedly dropped on top of the 
open reactor to seal it off had in fact missed their target; the resulting 
release of radionuclides was four to five times greater than even the 
most liberal estimates; and the alleged changes to the RMBK reactors 
still in operation may never have taken place or, even if they did, are 
nonetheless inadequate to assure safety.349 
The sarcophagus surrounding the crippled reactor is severely 
cracked and crumbling, and there is a significant danger of its collaps-
ing, thereby causing a whole new release of radioactivity.350 In addi-
tion, most of the better-trained nuclear operators were Russians, who 
have since returned home and left charge of the Ukraine's nuclear 
power plants in the hands of poorly trained Ukrainian operators.351 
Indications of the Ukrainian's inexperience in running their own re-
actors can be found in recent statistics citing a twenty-three percent 
increase in safety violations at nuclear facilities last year.352 
The long-term health effects due to the Chernobyl accident are now 
also beginning to surface: rates of thyroid cancer in children have 
increased ninety percent since the accident353 and countless other 
346 ld. 
347 Andrei Vaganov, Problem: Chemobyl Atomic Power Station Will Operote a While Longer, 
CURRENT DIG. OF THE POST-SOVIET PRESS, Nov. 24,1993, at 24. The Ukrainian chapter of the 
environmental organization Greenpeace claims that only two percent of the nation's electricity 
was produced at Chernobyl in 1992, and that such a minor reduction such as that does not justify 
the risks involved with allowing Chernobyl to continue operating. Ukrainian Branch of Green-
peace Says Ukraine is Heading "For a Nuclear Abyss," BBC Summary Of World Broadcasts 
(taken from ITAR-TASS News Agency), Oct. 26, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, 
International File. 
348 See, e.g., Jackson, supra note 4, at 44-45. 
349 Chandler, supra note 2, at 1, 12. 
350 Jackson, supra note 4, at 44. 
351 ld. at 44-45. 
352 See Violations Up Twenty-three Percent, supra note 301. 
353 See Radford, supra note 115. 
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children have been and still are being born with various deformities 
and maladies;354 breast cancer and blood disorders are also on the rise; 
a total of almost two million people within the Ukraine are described 
as needing "special attention" as a result of the exposure they suf-
fered from Chernobyl;355 and tests conducted on the female population 
indicate that women are aging an average of seven to nine years 
faster than norma1.356 Yet, despite these indications that the adverse 
health effects are increasing, none of the programs set up to aid 
Chernobyl's victims have received funding in over a month because 
there simply is no money available.357 
There have also been recent reports regarding the negative impact 
that Chernobyl has had on the environment, including the detection 
for the first time of americium-241, a highly dangerous radionuclide 
with a half life of 433 years, in the groundwater beneath the forest 
surrounding the Chernobyl plant.358 Additional amounts of radioac-
tively contaminated groundwater currently being held back by a con-
crete barrier is in danger of contaminating the water supply used by 
2.6 million people in Kiev.359 
These new statistics are particularly disturbing considering that 
the Ukrainian government is increasingly denying the seriousness of 
the environmental situation within their country. One example is that 
officials are now maintaining that all Ukrainian nuclear facilities are 
in perfect condition and pose no danger.36o Furthermore, the govern-
ment claims that no new health threats related to Chernobyl have 
emerged and that officials have long known about the presence of 
americium in the ground, but that they have not been concerned 
because the substance poses no dangers.361 One physician working 
with the government even stated that "[i]f all the plutonium and 
americium was swept from the nineteen mile zone (surrounding the 
Chernobyl area) and it entered the organisms of all Ukrainians, it 
354 Chernobyl Bay Arrives in UKfor Treatment, Press Assoc. N ewsfile, Jan. 5, 1994, available 
in LEXIS, Nexis Library, International File. 
355 See Radford, supra note 115. 
356 Scientists Affirm Chernobyl Radiation Drastically Accelerates Aging, Radio Ukraine 
World Service, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, International File. 
357 See Perera, supra note 6. 
358 Scientists Express Concern About Chernobyl, BBe, Dec. 24, 1993, available in LEXIS, 
N exis Library, International File. 
359 Jackson, supra note 4, at 45. 
360 Ukraine Denies Russia's Criticism of Nuclear Equipment, Xinhua News Agency, Dec. 17, 
1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, International File. 
361 Ukraine Denounces "Misinformation" About Chernobyl, REUTERS, LTD., Dec. 28, 1993, 
available in LEXIS, N exis Library, International File. 
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would have the same effect as watching television for four hours."362 
This type of language is all too reminiscent of claims during the Soviet 
era that "[n]uclear power stations are like stars that shine all day! ... 
They are perfectly safe.''363 
VI. THE NEED FOR GLOBAL ASSISTANCE 
Because the Ukraine is incapable and unwilling to tackle such en-
vironmental problems as the continuing threats posed by Chernobyl, 
the question arises of how the international community can and should 
help. The failure of other nations to collect damages from the Soviet 
Union as a result of losses they suffered due to Chernobyl,364 along 
with the lack of international treaties establishing an enforceable 
system of liability for accidents involving transnational radiation re-
leases,365 demonstrate that the ability of members of the international 
community to control events occurring at another nation's nuclear 
facilities is quite limited. But, if the crippled reactor number four at 
Chernobyl still has the potential to cause additional significant and 
possibly global damage;366 if the economically strapped Ukrainian gov-
ernment continues to use reactors with many of the same weaknesses 
found in the fourth Chernobyl reactor, including the other units at the 
Chernobyl site;367 if the nuclear industry has to be run on such a tight 
budget that sacrificing quality and safety is inevitable;368 if the staff 
at the power plants remains poorly trained;369 and if certain elements 
within the government have a complacent attitude about the condi-
362 [d. 
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tion of the nuclear industry,370 the global community runs the risk of 
being affected by another nuclear disaster sometime soon.371 It is 
therefore vital for the international community to determine what 
role it can play in order to help the Ukraine deal with its environ-
mental problems, and to protect the safety and health of all the world's 
peoples. In other words, given the potential global impact of sub-
sequent nuclear incidents, the world's leaders must consider whether 
or not "these decisions of such consequence for the future of the world 
and for humanity as a whole [should] be left within the province of 
national jurisdictional determination .... "372 
As has already been discussed, no foreign nation received compen-
sation from the Soviet Union for the damage caused by Chernobyl,373 
and it is unlikely that a nation could be forced to pay such compensa-
tion even today.374 The problem is that even though the idea of an 
international nuclear regime that would provide clear-cut standards 
for conduct and would have the authority to sanction those who 
violated the standards sounds appealing in theory, attempts to do so 
will always run into the stumbling block of state sovereignty.375 Na-
tions are quite hesitant to allow an international organization to es-
tablish binding rules affecting how they may behave within their own 
borders, especially regarding the sensitive issue of nuclear energy.376 
Furthermore, because the Ukraine is currently having so many eco-
nomic difficulties,377 it would not be able to pay any damages resulting 
from another nuclear disaster even if it were feasible to utilize a given 
international treaty to assess such damages.378 Finally, any approach 
which served only a punitive function would not assist in addressing 
the roots of the Ukraine's economic and environmental problems. 
Given the low likelihood of a solution under the current interna-
tional law regime, the international community should look to the 
alternative solutions of international aid and support. Such assistance 
370 See supra notes 360--63 and accompanying text. 
371 See Sitnikov, supra note 5. 
372 Falk, The Global Environment and International Law: Challenge and Response, 23 KAN. 
L. REV. 385, 403 (1975). 
373 See supra notes 294-95 and accompanying text. 
374 See supra note 365 and accompanying text. 
375 See, e.g., SEGERSTAHL, supra note 215, at 102. 
376Id. 
377 See supra notes 334-40 and accompanying text. 
378 Aside from the preceding brief discussion, this Comment does not explore in depth the 
possibilities for enforcing universal international standards for the use of nuclear energy. This 
final section instead focuses on an alternative means of persuading the Ukraine to deal with its 
nuclear legacy. 
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would have to be structured so as to provide the help that the Ukraine 
needs to confront its environmental problems, but in such a way that 
the Ukraine would not regard these efforts as an infringement on its 
sovereignty. There are at least a couple of reasons for the rest of the 
world to adopt such a course of action: out of compassion for the 
continuing suffering of the many victims of ChernobyI,s79 and because 
such efforts would help protect the "global commons" that we all 
share by working to establish levels of "sustainable development" 
that are in all of our best interests if we hope to have a planet that 
we can utilize while still preserving for future enjoyment.380 This lofty 
ideal of protecting the "global commons" has an extremely practical 
side to it: if we all accept environmental problems as our common 
responsibility and try to alleviate them now by assisting developing 
countries in creating safe, reliable industries, it will save money for 
everyone in the long run because prevention is inevitably cheaper 
than cleanup of environmental disasters.38! 
There is one additional reason for the global community to help the 
Ukraine deal with the legacy of Chernobyl. The Ukraine did not cause 
the disaster, and only because of a cruel example of geographic mis-
fortune and imposed state succession were the accident and its after-
math located on its territory.382 When the Soviet Union dissolved, the 
Ukraine was left to handle a disproportionately large burden created 
by the abuses of the Soviet system, costing the young republic a total 
of over $300 million a year for clean-up efforts, which it can ill-afford 
and which is not even nearly enough to tackle the problem.383 
Fortunately, there are many unilateral and multilateral efforts un-
der way which recognize the unique need to help the Ukraine and the 
other Republics cope with their environmental problems. Nations as 
diverse as Cuba, India, Great Britain, and the United States have 
established individual programs to help the Ukraine.384 The British 
379 See supra notes 299--305, 353-57 and accompanying text. 
380 See Our Common Future, World Commission on Environment and Development, 1-9, 
17-22 (1987) in BURNS H. WESTON ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW AND WORLD ORDER 1103-13 
(1990). 
381 'rye, supra note 150, at 1. 
382 Ukraine Has Right to Understanding and Assistance from International Organizations, 
BBC, Aug. 6, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, International File. 
383 See id. 
381 Chernobyl Children Arrive in Cuba for Treatment, Xinhua News Agency, Nov. 11, 1993; 
India Donates Medicines to Ukraine, Xinhua News Agency, Jan. 12, 1994; United States to Help 
Ukraine with Nuclear Power, REUTERS, LTD., Oct 25, 1993; Roger Hayes, West Can Aid 
Former Soviet Bloc Nuclear Clean-up, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 18, 1993, at 20, all available in LEXIS, 
Nexis Library, International File. 
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program is intended to help the Ukraine develop technology to re-
store contaminated land,385 and the American program which was 
announced in October of 1993 offers twenty-seven million dollars to 
upgrade safety standards at the nation's nuclear power plants and to 
train plant operators.386 Multi-party efforts include money to be do-
nated from the EC fund to assist with treating the victims' continuing 
medical problems,387 and a program under the auspices of the Euro-
pean Bank of Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) to improve 
safety conditions at the existing nuclear plants.338 
While these programs are all extremely important, they reflect the 
priorities of the donor agencies and each addresses only a limited 
portion of the overall problem. There is to date no comprehensive plan 
offered by the international community to address not only the imme-
diate problems but also the root structural weaknesses so that future 
crises can be avoided. The U.N. Deputy Secretary General for Hu-
manitarian Affairs, Jan Eliasson, recently advocated the estab-
lishment of such a program under the auspices of the U.N., but as yet 
no plan has been developed.389 It is vital for the U.N. to acknowledge 
the severity of the crisis faced by the Ukrainians and the other 
republics so as to overcome a previous lack of adequate foreign aid 
for Chernobyl,390 and also to neutralize any skepticism that might have 
resulted from recent statements by members of the International 
Atomic Energy Association to the effect that the Ukraine was exag-
gerating its problems in order to secure international financial aid.391 
Having the international community recognize the continuing threat 
posed by Chernobyl and its kin is particularly important because 
statements that minimize the impact of Chernobyl on the Ukraine 
bolster the efforts of some Ukrainian officials who do not want Cher-
nobyl and other environmental issues to be considered priorities.392 
Fortunately, there is one new development in the international 
arena which has the potential to provide the type of assistance that 
would truly help the Ukraine deal with its Chernobyl legacy: the 
recent disarmament agreement among the United States, the 
385 Hayes, supra note 384, at 20. 
386 See supra note 384. 
387 The Week in Eurape: London Boroughs to Benefit from EC Fund, PRESS ASS'N. 
NEWSFILE, Dec. 23, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, International File. 
388 Brownen Maddox, Survey of World Nuclear Industry, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 17, 1993, at 20. 
389 See Sitnikov, supra note 5. 
390 EC's Failure to Send Aid to Victims of Chernobyl, FIN. TIMES, LTD., May 9, 1991. 
391 Ukrainian Minister on Chernobyl Project; Criticized IAEA, BBG, Aug. 6, 1993, available 
in LEXIS, Nexis Library, International File. 
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Ukraine, and Russia.3°O In exchange for handing over the arsenal of 
nuclear weapons that was left on its soil after the demise of the Soviet 
Union, the Ukraine is scheduled to receive more than one billion 
dollars in aid.394 To date, however, most of the publicity that this 
agreement has received focuses on the importance of the Ukraine's 
giving up its nuclear weapons, and there are very few details available 
to the public regarding the specific breakdown of the aid to be given.395 
The United States should take this opportunity to highlight the 
seriousness of environmental conditions in the Ukraine and target the 
aid at dealing with the problems in a comprehensive manner. Such 
assistance should not be portrayed as a mere financial reward for the 
Ukrainians' giving up their weapons, but rather as aid that is being 
given in order to combat serious economic problems that stem largely 
from environmental crises. Although the United States could "attach 
some strings" to its aid package in this way, it would also be important 
to locate the fine line between making sure that the Ukraine uses the 
aid for effective projects, while still allowing the young nation some 
discretion in how to spend the money so that the United States' role 
would not be regarded as unwelcome interference in the Ukraine's 
internal affairs that could fuel anti-Western sentiment. This middle 
ground position could probably best be reached if a large part of the 
early aid emphasized training personnel and providing needed tech-
nology so that the Ukrainians could eventually carry out the neces-
sary measures themselves. 
Such a balanced approach would allow environmentalism to become 
popular again because the population would realize that their living 
conditions can improve when sustainable and environmentally 
friendly development is emphasized, that others are willing to share 
their burden, and that they are not being asked to make sacrifices 
without receiving something in return or to sacrifice some of their 
newfound independence in order to solve their environmental prob-
lems. It would also re-focus international attention on the importance 
of protecting our global environment for both altruistic and self-inter-
ested reasons, and of achieving this protection through mutual agree-
ments that emphasize not sanctions and condescension, but rather 
incentives and respect for one another and our shared environment. 
393 See, e.g., Ron Popeski, Kravchuk Faces Attacks on Arms, REUTERS, LTD., Jan. 20, 1994. 
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396 See id. See also Ukraine to Give Up Its Nuclear Weapons, ToRONTO STAR, Jan. 11, 1994, 
at AI. 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
The accident at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant remains the 
worst nuclear disaster in history. Not only did it have an immediate 
devastating impact on the surrounding population and environment, 
as well as a smaller but nonetheless significant effect throughout 
much of the world, it also left a destructive legacy that continues even 
today. Many of the long-term human, environmental, and economic 
consequences are only now beginning to emerge. There is also a risk 
of an additional disaster at the crippled reactor because a permanent 
solution to the massive radiation that remains has never been found, 
and many similarly flawed reactors remain in operation in the former 
Soviet Union. 
These continuing problems are all the more significant because the 
system which created the conditions facilitating the disaster still af-
fects the destiny of the young nations which emerged from its rubble. 
As a result, newly independent nations such as the Ukraine do not 
have the legal, societal or economic resources to cope with the envi-
ronmental nightmare they inherited. 
It is therefore in the best interests of the global community, for both 
humanitarian and self-interested reasons, to assist the Ukraine and 
its neighbors in finding long-term solutions to these problems in such 
a way that recognizes our common future but does not infringe on the 
sovereignty or the integrity of the states and their peoples. 
